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ABSTRACT
Research in microgravity (low-gravity) combustion pro-
mises innovations and improvements in fire prevention
and response for human-crew spacecraft. Findings
indicate that material flammability and fire spread in
microgravity are significantly affected by atmospheric
flow rate, oxygen concentration, and diluent composition.
This information can lead to modifications and correla-
tions to standard material-assessment tests for predic-
tion of fire resistance in space. Research on
smoke-particle changes in microgravity promises future
improvements and increased sensitivity of smoke detec-
tors in spacecraft. Research on fire suppression by
extinguishing agents and venting can yield new informa-
tion on effective control of the rare, but serious fire
events in spacecraft.
INTRODUCTION
Fire is a particularly feared hazard in confined enclo-
sures, as in spacecraft. A serious fire in an orbiting
spacecraft is an event of very low probability; neverthe-
less, some fire threats are foreseeable. Obvious exam-
ples include those of electrical and heating overloads,
spills and resulting aerosols, energetic experiment fail-
ures, and ignition of accumulated trash [1]. The overall
spacecraft fire-safety strategy considers both the preven-
tion of, and the response to, fires. Fire prevention, of
course, implies that one or more of the three general fire-
causing factors, namely, ignition energy, fuel, or oxygen,
can be eliminated. Fire response (since fire prevention
is never guaranteed) implies that provisions are in place
for early warning of breakdown events, intervention to
limit and suppress the resulting fire, and restoration of
normal conditions following the event [2].
This paper reviews the current state of the art in space-
craft fire safety and discusses the findings of microgra-
vity combustion research as they relate to practical fire
prevention and response.
FIRE PREVENTION IN SPACECRAFT
FIRE PREVENTION BY ELIMINATION OF IGNITION
SOURCES
Spacecraft designs and operations must meet standards
that serve to eliminate, or at least diminish, ignition-
energy threats. These requirements cover the usual
practices of electrical bonding and grounding, electrical
and thermal overload protection, working-pressure relief
settings, and similar safety procedures. Spacecraft wire-
and cable-capacity allowances are highly conservative to
limit stress and heating during normal operations. For
example, maximum current values are derated to one-
half of the usual current allowance for 200 °C insulation
service [3].
FIRE PREVENTION BY MATERIAL SELECTION
The major consideration in spacecraft fire prevention is
that of the elimination of potential fuels. As far as possi-
ble, spacecraft materials and assemblies meet specified
performance criteria of non-flammability, as determined
by prior testing (on the ground). Spacecraft fire-preven-
tion tests and standards are, for the most part, exten-
sions of aircraft practices, but their philosophy of risk
reduction differs from that of aircraft because of the parti-
cular needs of spacecraft safety. For example, structural
and decorative panel materials for aircraft must meet
standards of minimum heat-release rate upon ignition.
This criterion is necessary to prevent or delay the growth
of an established fire into flashover (generalized fire
spread away from the point of origin), ensuring adequate
escape time following crash fires. Similar panel mater-
ials for spacecraft, in contrast, must meet standards of a
minimum flame-spread distance (self-extinguishment)
upon ignition. This criterion is necessary to prevent igni-
tion events from developing into fires of any significant
size.
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Table 1. Test Methods for Evaluating the Flammability of Materials for Use in NASA Human-Crew Space Missions
Test
No.
1
2
Application
17
Sheets, coatings, foams, insulated wires
Sheets, coatings, foams that fail to meet the
criteria of Test 1; also major-use nonmetals
with greater than 0.37-m 2 exposure
Liquids, coatings
4 Insulated wires
8 Containers
Metals, nonmetals for oxygen service
Title (Reference ASTM Test)
Upward Flame Propagation
Heat and Visible Smoke Release Rates
(Oxygen Consumption (Cone) Calori-
meter, ASTM E-1354)
Flash Point of Liquids (Pensky-Martens
Closed Tester, ASTM D-93)
Electrical Wire Insulation Flammability
Flammability Test for Materials in Vented
or Sealed Containers
Upward Flammability of Materials in
Gaseous Oxygen
For U.S. spacecraft, fire-resistant items are selected
through testing standards defined in the NASA Hand-
book NHB 8060.1C [4]. Table 1 summarizes the princi-
pal flammability tests.
The test of widest application is Test 1, which has been
in use for over 25 years with minor upgrading. The per-
formance criterion of Test 1 is the self-extinguishment of
a 30-cm-long by 5-cm-wide sample, mounted vertically
and ignited chemically at the bottom, before any resulting
flame progresses for a distance of 15 cm or beyond
(shown as the limiting flame-spread height on Fig. 1).
Almost all materials spark or drip flaming particles when
ignited. Therefore, in addition to the self-extinguishment
criterion, an acceptable material must not ignite a sheet
of paper mounted horizontally 20 cm below the sample
holder. Typical Test 1 materials are thin sheets, films,
foam blocks, and coatings on end-use substrates or on
aluminum foil. Test 1 is analogous in principle to the
aviation standard method, FAR 25.853, the 12-second
vertical Bunsen-burner test for qualifying insulation batts
[5]. For space materials, fire resistance is determined
within a closed chamber at the worst-case-use oxygen
concentration and pressure environment, currently 30-
vol% oxygen in nitrogen at 70.3 kPa [6]. This atmos-
phere corresponds to the Shuttle and International Space
Station (ISS) environments that are prescribed for crew
conditioning prior to extravehicular activities, or that may
be encountered as the maximum tolerance level in
emergencies.
Test 4, illustrated in Fig. 2, is an adaptation of Test 1 to
evaluate the fire resistance of wires or wire bundles
under electrical loads. A 31-cm length of wire is
mounted at an angle of 15 -ofrom the vertical, a position
found to give less interference from combustion products
or flow of molten insulation than vertical mounting [7].
(A comparable test for aircraft wiring insulations is per-
formed at angle of 30 -0from the vertical.)
If wire bundles are to be tested, six non-connected wires
are cut and laced to the active conductor. The current-
carrying wire is preheated by direct current to an initial
temperature of 125 C, or to the maximum operating tem-
perature of the wire, for five minutes. Then, the wire is
ignited by a chemical igniter or by increasing the internal
heating current. The criteria of maximum burn length
(visible insulation consumption) prior to self-extinguish-
ment and non-ignition of a paper sheet by hot particles
are the same as for Test 1.
Test 2, illustrated in Fig. 3, determines the ignitability,
maximum and average rate of heat release, and amount
of smoke obscuration in a standard calorimeter that pre-
heats the samples under a controlled atmosphere by an
external heat flux from a conical heater [6]. The samples
are ignited by a spark plug, if they do not self-ignite upon
preheating. Test 2 is required for major-use nonmetallic
panels and as an option for the retest of the flammability
of sheet or panel samples failing Test 1.
Test 3 is a standard procedure for determining the flash
point of liquids, which is basically the minimum tempera-
ture for possible ignition in air. Test 8 is a test for the
flammability of otherwise non-acceptable materials con-
tained in protective storage [8]. Test 17 is a test of fire-
safety performance in oxygen-handling systems, which
are critical components in space operations, both intern-
ally and externally.
For European spacecraft, fire-resistant items are sel-
ected generally through the same testing methods and
performance standards prescribed for U.S. spacecraft,
with the addition of a limiting-oxygen-index test (ASTM
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D2863-97) for sheet plastic materials [9]. This test
determines downward flame propagation, in contrast to
the upward propagation of NASA Test 1; but, in most
cases, the criterion of high-oxygen-index will pass and
fail the same materials as the criterion of upward-flame-
extinguishment [10].
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Figure 1. Sketch of apparatus for NASA NHB 8060.1C,
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Figure 2. Sketch of apparatus for NASA NHB 8060.1C,
Test 4, Electrical Wire Flammability Test.
Upward-flammability assessment offers several advant-
ages in the screening of materials. The NASA Test 1
simulates the beginning of a fire with an ignition flux of
typically 75 kW/m _ maintained for 25 sec [11]. It is a
severe "worst-case" test in terms of ignition energy,
means of edge ignition, direction of buoyancy-assisted
flame spread, sample thickness, and oxygen concentra-
tion. Results are rarely ambiguous: samples clearly pass
or fail. All assessments are documented by videotaped
records for future review. Although Test 1 is basically a
qualitative, "pass-fail" evaluation, investigators have
shown that, from tests on selected spacecraft materials,
there is a linear correlation of the Test 2 rate-of-heat-
release data to the Test 1 flame-spread rate and length
of penetration [12].
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Figure 3. Sketch of apparatus for NASA NHB 8060.1C,
Test 2, Heat and Visible Smoke-Release Rates.
More important than whether the standard tests can
represent the expected thermal environment in space-
craft fire scenarios is whether the tests can represent the
convective environment. In this regard, it is obvious that
all practical spacecraft flammability testing, as well as
performance and calibration testing of fire-detection and
suppression technology, is of necessity conducted on the
ground, at normal gravity (the sea-level acceleration of
9.8 m/s_), not in the environment of the orbiting space-
craft. Still, the use of ground-based test methods and
criteria has provided an extensive database of thousands
of qualified articles whose fire resistance contributes to
the record of effective fire prevention in U.S. space
missions [13].
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Although the great majority of articles for space usage
are qualified as fire-resistant, there are many more
items, necessary in the spacecraft inventory, that cannot
meet the fire performance standards. Common exam-
ples are paper, cotton clothing and towels, minor plastic
parts, and data films. In addition, there are some essen-
tial "off-the-shelf' appliances with components that
cannot be verified for fire resistance. The presence and
location of these articles are carefully documented
before each mission. Techniques to reduce the fire risk
of these items include limitation of quantity and spacing,
elimination of fire-propagation paths between articles,
and storage in non-flammable containers or under non-
flammable covers [8].
FIRE PREVENTION BY ATMOSPHERIC SELECTION
An atmosphere that sustains human life ordinarily sup-
ports fire spread. Nevertheless, one can define, in
theory, atmospheres that support human life yet inhibit
fire spread [14]). One approach is to take advantage of
the fact that humans require a minimum quantity of oxy-
gen regardless of the total pressure (within limits), but
fires require a minimum concentration of oxygen in the
diluted atmosphere [15,16]. Thus, an atmosphere modi-
fied through nitrogen pressurization retains a sea-level
oxygen partial pressure for life support, with a reduced
oxygen concentration to prevent fire spread. A typical
atmosphere meeting this criterion is one with a concen-
tration of 13.9 vol% oxygen at a total pressure of
151 kPa [17]. This total pressure, however, is far beyond
the usual spacecraft structural limits.
An alternative fire-inhibiting atmosphere is one with the
oxygen quantity reduced to a minimum for life support,
but with no change in total pressure [t8]. An oxygen
partial pressure equivalent to that of a pressure altitude
of 2400 m (8000 ft) produces a concentration of 15.6%, if
the total pressure remains at 101 kPa. This is actually a
minimum off-normal environment permitted in the U.S.
spacecraft requirements. The oxygen concentration in
this atmosphere may not be low enough to prevent igni-
tion and flame spread in all materials, however.
Since the atmosphere within the spacecraft is entirely
controllable, other diluents with differing thermal char-
acteristics may be substituted for all or part of the nitro-
gen. Medical and combustion specialists have sug-
gested oxygen-diluent atmospheres that can sustain life
yet inhibit flame spread [19]. None of the "fire-safe"-
atmosphere proposals is a serious contender for even
preliminary research, however. One argument against
unconventional atmospheres is the need for reference air
atmospheres for biological and medical experiments in
space [18]. More compelling negative arguments are the
logistic and structural impacts of gas-pressure and gas-
storage changes and the unknown effects of long-term
exposure to modified atmospheres on the crew perform-
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ance and health under the stressful conditions of space
operations [20].
THE INFLUENCE OF LOW GRAVITY ON FIRE
BEHAVIOR
IGNITION PROCESSES IN MICROGRAVlTY
Practical fire prevention and control in orbiting and plan-
etary-transit spacecraft must respond to the unique
effects of the non-convective, low-gravity environment
(microgravity) on fire initiation [21]. For example, over-
heated motors, bearings, and other components will
remain hot because of the minimal convective heat
transfer in microgravity, and they can present serious
ignition threats for a long time. Again, spills or line
breaks can create aerosols or particle clouds that persist
indefinitely in microgravity because of the lack of density-
driven settling. These heterogeneous arrays are known
to be highly flammable. Furthermore, recent research
shows that, if ignition occurs, the resulting peak explo-
sion pressures in these mixtures are stronger in micro-
gravity than in normal gravity, due to the uniform and
stable composition of the aerosols in microgravity [22].
The absence of downward motion also contributes to the
hazards from effervescing or easily vaporized materials,
which tend to eject hot bubbles or drops when ignited.
These globules can drip harmlessly in normal gravity, but
they propel radially as potential ignition sources in low
gravity [23,24].
FIRES IN QUIESCENT AIR IN MICROGRAVITY
It is generally assumed that materials qualified as fire-
resistant in ground testing will be equally or more fire
resistant in microgravity service. Early studies of the
combustion of sheet samples of common spacecraft
materials (e.g., paper, plastics, cotton, aluminized Mylar)
in static-chamber tests conducted on the Skylab space
station showed that, in all cases, the observed flame-
spread rates are slower than the corresponding rates on
the ground [25]. The relationship of flame-spread rates
measured in low gravity to those in normal gravity is
unique for each material, and no quantitative correlation
of gravity effects can be obtained from these tests. Sub-
sequent research on the combustion of thin-sheet mater-
ials, conducted in a variety of low-gravity venues, such
as drop towers, parabolic-trajectory airplanes, the Shut-
tle, and Mir, has confirmed these qualitative findings.
Moreover, these results show that, for thin solid fuels
burning in non-flow (quiescent) microgravity environ-
ments, the flammability range (minimum oxygen concen-
tration) is reduced, the fuel mass-loss rate is less, the
flame temperature is lower, the rate of heat release is
lower, and the soot production is reduced, as compared
to the corresponding qualities in normal-gravity combus-
tion [26-28]. For thick sheet materials burning in non-
flow microgravity environments, the flame-spread rate
decreaseswithtimeandtheflametendsto self-exting-
uish,althoughcombustionmaypersistseveralminutes
[29].
Thereare a fewexceptionsto the generalizationthat
flammabilityis reducedinquiescentmicrogravity.Metal
wires mayburn more rapidlyin high-oxygenenviron-
mentsinspacethanonEarth,becausethemoltendrop-
let doesnotdetachfromtheflamezoneanddripaway
[30]. Recentlyreportedstudiesshowgreaterratesof
flamespreadin microgravityfor verticalburningwire
insulations,althoughthe wiresthemselvesmay have
servedas a heatsourceor sink,complicatingthe inter-
pretationof theseresults[31]. The situationswhere
flammabilitymaybeacceleratedin quiescentmicrogra-
vity appearto be rare,and theycorrespondto very
unusualscenariosforpotentialspacecraftireevents.
FLOW-ASSISTEDFIRESINMICROGRAVITY
Themitigationoffireseverity,ascomparedtothecorres-
pondingnormal-gravitybehavior,occursonlyinnon-flow
conditionsinmicrogravity.Thisquiescentflameenviron-
mentis uniqueto microgravity.Normal-gravityflames
generatestrong,gravity-drivenbuoyantcurrents,dueto
densitydifferencesbetweenthecombustiongasesand
the surroundingatmosphere.Thesecurrentsaid the
combustionreactionandtheflamespreadby removing
combustionproductsand introducingambientoxygen
intotheflamezone. Thelackof natural-convectiveflow
in microgravityis the principalcauseof the relatively
weakflames.
In actuality,except in closedcombustionchambers,
spacecraftatmospheresarenotquiescent.Ventilation
foratmosphericconditioningandcomponentcoolingpro-
videsa continuousflow environment.Typicalhuman-
crewspacecraftaredesignedto maintaina comfortable
atmosphericcirculationat lowsuperficialvelocities,over
a nominalrangeof 6 to 20cm/s. Combustionresearch
nowobservesthat,at leastforthincellulosicfuels,the
additionof low-velocityforcedflowgreatlyincreasesthe
microgravityflamespread. In fact, the flow-promoted
microgravityflame-spreadratesmay exceedthose in
comparabledownwardflamespreadin normalgravity
(but not those in buoyancy-promotedupwardflame
spread)[21]. Equallyimportant,theflammabilityrange,
definedby the limitingoxygenconcentrationfor flame
spread,witha slow,forcedflowinmicrogravityisgreater
thanthat in correspondingdownwardspread[32]and
approximatelyequalto thatfor upwardspreadin normal
gravity[33].
Intheusualcombustiontest,ignitionisat oneendof a
stripsample,andtheflamecanpropagateonlyin the
directionof theunburnedfuel,regardlessof theair-flow
direction.Testson thincellulosicfuelswithcentraligni-
tionshowthatthemicrogravityflamewillpropagatepre-
ferentiallyinto the flow,or in the opposed(upstream)
direction[34].Thisbehavioroccurs because the oxygen
is completely consumed in this direction and is unavail-
able downstream. This observation is clearly the reverse
of common experience in normal gravity, where flow pro-
motes the flame in the concurrent (downstream) direction
[35].
The addition of low-velocity flow is also shown to sustain
flame spread over thick sheet materials in microgravity,
which, as noted, tend to self-extinguish under quiescent
conditions [36]. Similarly, wire insulations usually resist
flame spread in quiescent microgravity but burn readily
under low air velocities [37]. For smoldering, recent stu-
dies report that propagation through bulk polyurethane
foam is sustained in microgravity by minimum velocities
as low as 1 mm/s [38].
OXYGEN-ASSISTED FIRES IN MICROGRAVITY
The Mir fire in February 1997, caused by the failure of a
solid-oxygen generator, is a good example of the diffi-
culty in predicting potential fire scenarios in spacecraft.
The Mirfire propagated in a highly convective local envir-
onment, at an elevated oxygen concentration, self-gener-
ated by the source of the fire. It is no surprise that these
conditions favor rapid flame spread even in microgravity.
Drop-tower studies on thin-paper samples, illustrated in
Fig. 4, show that flame-spread rates increase with oxy-
gen concentration in quiescent microgravity and
approach those values obtained in downward normal
gravity at concentrations of 40% and greater [39]. Air-
plane studies on thin polymethylmethacrylate (PMMA)
samples show similar, substantial increases in spread
rates with increasing oxygen concentration; but, in this
case, the low-gravity rates are always less that those in
normal gravity, even at oxygen concentrations as high as
90% [24].
A series of Shuttle tests, the Solid Surface Combustion
Experiment (SSCE), provided quantitative data on the
effects of atmospheric oxygen concentration and total
pressure on thin-paper flame spread in quiescent micro-
gravity [27]. A summary of flame-spread rate determina-
tions is shown in Fig. 5. (Each data point represents the
results from a separate Shuttle mission.) The increase in
oxygen concentration from 35 to 50% increases the
flame-spread rates by factors of three to four. The two-
fold increase in total pressure also increases the flame-
spread rate by a factor of about 1.5 (for the 50%-02
concentration).
For thick materials, the effect of increasing oxygen con-
centration is qualitatively similar to that on thin materials.
The SSCE program included tests on relatively thick
strips of PMMA at oxygen concentrations of 50 and 70%.
As noted earlier, in the quiescent atmosphere, the flame-
spread rate is not uniform, but plots of flame position with
time clearly show that the level of flame propagation is
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much more rapid at 70% 02 at all stages of the combus-
tion [29].
DILUENT-MODIFIED FIRES IN MICROGRAVITY
The influence of the diluent component of the quiescent
microgravity atmosphere on fires has been studied for
cases of
1. the inclusion of combustible gases (at concentrations
below the lower flammability limit of the additive), or
2. the replacement of the usual nitrogen diluent with
other inert gases.
The presence of combustible gases in the spacecraft
atmosphere is a possible consequence of such break-
down events as leakage, pyrolysis, or decomposition.
The replacement of nitrogen by other inertants may be
intentional for purposes of life support or for fire
inhibition.
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Figure 4. Experimental data on flame-spread rates and
flammability limits of thin-paper fuels for downward nor-
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Figure 5. Experimental data on flame-spread rates in
quiescent microgravity, from Solid Surface Combustion
Experiment [27].
Recent results from tests on the flammability and flame
spread of thin cellulosic fuels in diluent-modified atmos-
pheres are most interesting. For the inclusion of com-
bustible gases, the remarkable finding is that low
concentrations of carbon monoxide or methane in air
increase the flame-spread rate in proportion to the fuel-
gas concentration and this influence is stronger in micro-
gravity than in normal gravity [40]. In fact, at higher
concentrations of carbon monoxide, the microgravity
flame-spread rates exceed those in corresponding nor-
mal gravity.
For the replacement of nitrogen diluent, the tests show
that, for nitrogen, helium, or argon dilution, the flame-
spread rate and flammability range are reduced in
microgravity compared to normal gravity. (Selected data
are in Table 2.) For carbon-dioxide dilution, the gravity
effects are slight, but for sulfur-hexafluoride dilution, the
flame-spread rate and flammability are substantially
increased in microgravity. On the other hand, the
absolute levels of flame-spread rate and flammability
with these gases are still well below those of the other
diluents in both environments, and the gases act
basically as flame suppressants [40,41].
MATERIAL-ASSESSMENT TESTS FOR
MICROGRAVITY USAGE
Applied experimental combustion studies are now under-
way, aiming at systematic measurements of flame
spread over practical materials in ventilated microgravity.
One such project measures flame-spread rates over
cylindrical plastic specimens with controlled air flow in a
Russian flow-tunnel facility operated on Mir. Another
project, Diffusive and Radiative Transport in Fires
(DARTFire), also measures flame spread over thick
PMMA sheets in a combustion tunnel operated on
sounding rockets. DARTFire incorporates imposed flow,
atmospheric control, and radiant heat flux as variables in
the experiments [42].
Research projects are also investigating test methods to
predict fire resistance in space based on modifications or
correlations of normal-gravity assessments [43]. A study
in progress is developing a new ignition-delay and flame-
spread test incorporating external heat flux and low-velo-
city flow as part of the flammability-test routine [44].
Combustion specialists are aware of the difficulty in
reproducing the flow and energy fields in the microgravity
environment for these material-qualification assess-
ments. It is thus unlikely that any single test method will
ever be found that is capable of characterizing material
acceptability for all incipient-fire scenarios in space [45].
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Table 2. Flammability of Thin Cellulosic Sheet Fuels Under Atmospheres with Varying Diluents (from [40])
Oiluent-_ CO 2 SF,N2 He Ar
NORMAL GRAVITY
Flammability
Limit, % 02: 16 16.5 11.5 24 38
Flame-Spread
Rate, cm/s: 0.9 1.8 1.9 ......
at 20%-02
at 25%-02 1.3 2.7 3.0 0.5 ---
at 30%-02 1.7 3.5 4.1 1.2 ---
at 35%-O 2 2.2 4.3 1.7 ---
at 40%-02 3.0 5.0 1.9 0.45
at 45%-O 2 2.3 0.95
QUIESCENT MICROGRAVITY
Flammability
Limit, % 02: 17 21
Flame-Spread
Rate, cm/s: 0.6
at 20%-02
at 25%-02 0.9
at 30%-02 1.1
at 35%-02 1.4
at 40%-02 2.0
at 45%-02
13 21 29
--- 1.3 ......
1.7 2.0 0.75 ---
2.1 2.6 1.3 0.35
2.4 1.7 0.6
2.5 1.9 1.0
2.0 1.5
FIRE DETECTION IN SPACE ENVIRONMENTS
STATUS OF FIRE DETECTION IN SPACECRAFT
In the five fire-precursor incidents experienced in more
than 18 years of Shuttle Transportation System
missions, the crew detected the problems by odor and
sight and responded by isolating and deenergizing the
affected electrical circuits [13]. In the most serious inci-
dent, a cable strain and insulation failure created an elec-
trical short circuit, which caused the expulsion of embers
and particles [46]. That incident resulted in an estimated
maximum particle concentration of only one-tenth of the
alarm setting, and consequently the smoke detectors did
not alarm.
Thus, sensing by the crew can be relied on for the early
warning of incipient fires in spacecraft; and, in the first
U.S. human-crew space missions (Mercury, Gemini, and
Apollo), this was the only means of fire detection. The
first automated fire detectors installed in spacecraft were
those in the 1974 Skylab space station, which had a col-
lection of 30 radiation detectors sensitive to fire-genera-
ted emissions in the ultraviolet spectrum. This type of
detector is a line-of-sight sensor, and it responds to
already established fires.
All human-crew spacecraft subsequent to Skylab have
been equipped with smoke detectors, which have the
advantages of generalized sampling and high sensitivity
to smoke particulates emitted not only from incipient fires
but also from smoldering and pyrolysis events [47].
Smoke detectors sense the buildup of particles in the
atmosphere by several means, including ionization-
current interruption, photoelectric scattering and obscur-
ation, quartz-crystal microbalance response, or conden-
sation-nuclei counting. Detectors employing the first two
principles, ionization and photoelectric, have been
adapted for practical service onboard spacecraft; and,
indeed, these are the types found in almost all commer-
cial smoke detectors on Earth.
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CURRENT FIRE DETECTION FOR SPACECRAFT LOW-GRAVITY PERFORMANCE
The ionization detectors of the Shuttle and its payload-
bay laboratories (Spacelab, for example) are the first
smoke detectors designed specifically for installation in
spacecraft [48]. An aerodynamic separator causes parti-
cles larger than about 2 _m (dust, perhaps) to bypass
the ionization chamber. The flow through the inlet separ-
ator and the sensing chambers is created by an internal
fan, a vane pump, which may also promote the sampling
effectiveness in the non-convective environment,
although the manufacturer states that the fan is solely for
particle separation [49].
The photoelectric detectors of the pressurized modules
of the International Space Station (ISS) utilize the prin-
ciple of attenuation or scattering of light by smoke parti-
cles [50]. The scattering measurement is the primary
source for the alarm circuitry. The obscuration signal is
used for built-in tests and zero-drift adjustments [51].
The long-wave-length visible light source makes these
detectors most sensitive to particles larger than 0.3 _m in
size.
The Shuttle and ISS detection systems are not identical
because they have different design requirements and
must meet varied constraints, such as allotted power,
volume, functionality, serviceability, and useful lifetime.
For operation on the ISS, the photoelectric detector has
recognized advantages over the Shuttle ionization type in
its much lower power requirement, slightly lower mass,
and lack of moving parts [48].
On Earth, smoke detectors are located on ceilings
because buoyancy carries the particle-laden air upward
first before spreading down to the floor. In the absence
of buoyancy, detector location is less certain. On the
Shuttle, detectors are located in ventilation paths in the
avionics bays and the flight decks. On the ISS, detectors
monitoring the equipment racks within each module will
be installed with their light paths directly within cooling-air
return pipes, or exposed to the general air-circulation
flow. The ISS modules supplied by the U.S., European,
Japanese, and Italian space agencies have identical fire
prevention, detection, and suppression requirements and
operations [52]. Because the elements of the Russian
segment have been designed independently and in some
cases prior to the designs of the ISS, they have different
fire-response systems. The Functional Cargo Block
(Zarya), the first assembly element of the ISS, placed in
orbit on November 1998, has ten ionization smoke
detectors, similar in principle to those on the Shuttle [53].
The Service Module, the primary Russian element, to be
launched on the third assembly mission, has photoelec-
tric detectors, of the type used in Mir.
The overall reliability of the Shuttle detectors has been
high. Through almost 100 Shuttle missions, covering
over 18,000 hr of orbital operations, there have been
less than 15 reported false alarms or built-in-test failures.
Criteria for alarm thresholds are established for the
ionization and photoelectric smoke detectors from testing
and calibrations against model fires in normal gravity
[48]. For performance in microgravity, however, there
are concerns over the possible slow response and low
sensitivity of detectors to the nearly invisible flames with
little apparent smoke, as observed in quiescent and low-
flow conditions [54]. Furthermore, the criteria for sensiti-
vity and false-alarm rejection of the smoke detectors
depend on foreknowledge of the size and size distribu-
tion of the particles released in a fire event. Limited
experiments in low gravity indicate that particulates tend
to be larger than in normal gravity in the early stages of a
fire (Fig. 6), most likely because the lack of convective
movement favors the agglomeration of individual
particles [55].
A science experiment on the Shuttle, Comparative Soot
Diagnostics, investigated the effluent-particle sizes gen-
erated by overheated wiring insulation, pyrolyzing sili-
cone rubber, burning paraffin, and burning paper in a
slow-moving air stream [56]. The experiment also
exposed a Shuttle detector unit and an ISS detector pro-
totype to the particulate-air stream a few meters down-
stream of the sources to determine the sensitivity and
response of the detectors in microgravity. Fig. 7 is a
selection of the results for one of the tests to illustrate the
detector responses following the pyrolysis of polyimide-
insulated wiring. The igniter that promoted the pyrolysis
event was turned on for a period of about 20 sec. The
scattering signal of the ISS photoelectric detector actua-
ted first, reaching full scale at about 20-sec elapsed time,
during the period when the igniter was still on. The sig-
nal of the prototype ISS unit was amplified because of a
low signal level from what is now known to be a defective
early model. The Shuttle ionization detector actuated
about 20 seconds later, with its characteristic signal of a
distinct decrease from full scale, which should trigger an
alarm circuit, then a gradual return to the original value.
Both detectors responded adequately, in the illustrated
manner, to most pyrolysis, smoldering, and flaming
events (allowing for the amplification of the ISS signal),
with delays of the order of 10 to 70 sec to reach an
assumed actuation level. The Shuttle detector, however,
did not attain a significant signal level for liquid smoke
particulates from smoldering paper and silicone rubber.
The important qualitative conclusion of the study is that
the relative responsiveness of these detectors is different
in microgravity compared to normal gravity, most likely
due to the differences in particle sizes and morphology.
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Figure 6. Examples of soot particles collected over
ethylene diffusion burners (note differing scales of
magnification). (a) Normal gravity. (b) Low gravity.
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Figure 7. Time sequence of ignition events and detector
responses following pyrolysis of polyimide wire insula-
tion, from Comparative Soot Diagnostics Experiment
[56].
RADIATION AND GAS DETECTION
FIRE CONTROL AND SUPPRESSION IN
SPACECRAFT
STATUS OF FIRE SUPPRESSION ON SPACECRAFT
Spacecraft have always been equipped with fire exting-
uishers as protection against spreading fires [61]. In the
Mercury and Gemini spacecraft, a water gun used for
food reconstitution was designated for the secondary
purpose of an emergency fire extinguisher [62]. The
next generation of space missions was equipped with
dedicated fire extinguishers. The Apollo spacecraft, for
example, had foam-based extinguishers, which gener-
ated a stable water-gas mixture propelled by inert Freon
and nitrogen gases. At present, the agents of choice for
spacecraft are compressed gases, with exceptions to be
noted.
CURRENT REQUIREMENTS AND PRACTICES
In the Shuttle, if a fire is detected in the cabin, the
expected crew response is to turn off the cabin fan, don
the protective helmets (part of the launch and entry
suits), and discharge a portable fire extinguisher. If a fire
is detected in an equipment rack or an avionics bay, the
expected crew response is to deenergize the affected
circuits or the entire rack, then also don the protective
helmets, and discharge a portable fire extinguisher. The
rack covers have circular holes (fire ports) for insertion of
fire-extinguisher nozzles to flood the interiors. The Shut-
tle crew also has the option of fire fighting through the
discharge of extinguisher bottles mounted in the cabin
and in each avionics bay, actuated by control-panel
switches. The availability of the fixed suppression sys-
tem on the Shuttle is essential to safety, because during
reentry, the crew is immobile and has no access to the
portable fire extinguishers.
The original designs of the ISS also included flame-radia-
tion sensors for overall monitoring of the modules and
some of the enclosed standoff and rack volumes within
the modules [51]. The need to conserve mass and elec-
tric power eliminated these detectors from the ISS
designs, but technology development continues in the
European Space Agency on flame detectors for supple-
mentary fire detection [57].
Discrete sampling of the spacecraft atmosphere for trace
constituents, particularly carbon monoxide, can also pro-
vide early warning of incipient fires or smoldering [58].
Active development is underway on continuous analysis
systems for the ISS [59]. Gas sensing for fire detection
has advantages of rapid, sensitive, but non-localized res-
ponse. A promising concept for the future is that of com-
bined detection systems, with multiple logic responding
to both carbon monoxide and smoke, if these can be
accommodated within the spacecraft mass and power
allowances [60].
The ISS will have portable extinguishers only. After the
Phase II assembly is complete, the station will always
have a mobile crew on hand; hence the added complex-
ity of a fixed system is not necessary [63]. The ISS
extinguisher will have two interchangeable nozzles: one,
a cone for streaming application in open areas, and the
other, a tube for flooding application by insertion into a
rack fire port. Each rack closure will have a membrane-
protected fire port to permit internal flooding of the rack
by insertion of the extinguisher nozzle, as in the Shuttle.
Upon a verified alarm, software will shut down cabin ven-
tilation within the affected module and remove local elec-
trical power at the fire location within 30 seconds. The
ISS suppression system is designed to release sufficient
agent to reduce the ambient oxygen in a local affected
volume to half the original concentration within 60
seconds [52]. A module can also be isolated from the
rest of the ISS complex by closing valves to cut off the
intermodule ventilation.
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FIRE-EXTINGUISHING AGENTS
The Shuttle and its payload-bay laboratories have exting-
uishers charged with gaseous Halon 1301 (bromotri-
fluoromethane). The manufacture and new uses of
Halon 1301, which has a high ozone-depletion potential,
are now prohibited by international protocol [64]. Exist-
ing installations such as those on the Shuttle may be
retained indefinitely. Halon 1301 is an extremely efficient
fire extinguisher, chemically inhibiting the combustion
reactions. Concentrations of no more than 6% are suf-
ficient to extinguish most fires, except perhaps some that
are deep-seated. Halon 1301 does generate toxic and
corrosive products, but in standard discharge rates, the
product concentrations are very low. Shuttle flights may
continue if the measured trace-product contamination
following an extinguisher discharge is within the space-
craft maximum allowable concentrations. Early mission
termination and return to ground is, of course, an option
to ensure safety on the Shuttle.
The ISS will have extinguishers charged with carbon
dioxide in all its segments except for those in the Russ-
ian segment (developed independently), which will have
water-based foam extinguishers [63]. Carbon dioxide
has been selected through trade-off studies, which com-
pare weighted attributes of competing agents for space-
craft application. Carbon dioxide has advantages in its
low cost, availability, reliability, and absence of halogen-
ated products. It is a relatively inefficient agent, since its
action is by oxygen dilution, requiring as much as 50%-
CO 2 concentrations in local volumes. Leakage may
generate excessive, toxic atmospheric concentrations,
difficult to remove by the standard ISS environmental-
control system [65].
Nitrogen is under consideration for suppression protec-
tion in small, attended volumes, such as the airlock of the
ISS. Nitrogen avoids the toxicity issue of carbon dioxide,
although it is even less efficient as a suppression agent
[66].
Mixed-phase, water-based foams and mists are supplied
to the ISS Russian segment, as noted. These non-gase-
ous agents can be very effective, providing suppression
through flame cooling as well as oxygen dilution [67].
The liquid foam residues, however, are very difficult to
remove from the spacecraft atmosphere and surfaces
after fire control.
LOW-GRAVITY PERFORMANCE
The initial step in fire response is the shutoff of local and,
in some cases, module air circulation. As discussed in a
previous section, research has demonstrated that fires
over solid surfaces in microgravity tend to self-extinguish
when flow ceases. It is unknown, however, whether an
established fire of more than minimal size can be con-
trolled merely by removal of air flow. In spreading fires,
the expansion of the combustion gases and the expul-
sion of fuel particles may generate enough force to pro-
mote flow even in microgravity. Hence, fire suppression
by extinguishing agents is likely to be an essential res-
ponse to all but minor, incipient fires.
The microgravity environment may have little influence
on the process of extinguishment in flooding applications,
as within racks. Low gravity, however, will likely affect
streaming applications, perhaps making the physical
application more difficult and the rate of dispersion
slower. Clearly, the discharge of non-gaseous, mixed-
phase agents will require new techniques in low gravity,
since these agents depend on downward settling, a gra-
vity-aided process, to cover burning surfaces or liquid
pools. The Skylab tests examined the effect of water
sprays on burning samples in a chamber [25]. The spray
broke up into isolated droplets. Only a few droplets
struck the burning material, and they tended to scatter
the flaming material before extinguishing the flame.
More recent tests on an airplane flying parabolic trajec-
tories demonstrated the effective dispersion of water and
foam in low gravity, albeit in non-burning tests [68].
Researchers are particularly concerned with the relative
efficiency of fire suppression in microgravity. Results of
small-scale tests in drop towers, investigating the effect
of dilution of the atmosphere by suppressants on the
ignition and flame spread of thin fuels, are encouraging.
For Halon-1301 dilution, the quantity needed for sup-
pression is shown to be appreciably less in microgravity
than in corresponding normal gravity [62]. For carbon-
dioxide dilution, suppression effectiveness is also indi-
cated by reduced flammability compared to air or
nitrogen-oxygen reference cases [41]. These tests,
however, cannot demonstrate diluent effectiveness for
the scenario of extinguishment of an established,
spreading fire in ventilated microgravity.
FIRE FIGHTING AND POST-FIRE ACTIONS
The ISS has the option of abandoning a module, closing
its hatches, and venting the module, as a means to con-
trol a difficult or inaccessible fire. Proposed venting
capability is the attainment of a total pressure of 30 kPa
or less within 10 minutes [52]. The limit is arbitrary,
based on a compromise rate of venting. Slow depress-
urization delays suppression, but rapid depressurization
may cause flame intensification prior to suppression [25].
Results of recent small-scale research on venting exting-
uishment in low gravity offer a new venting criterion [69].
The studies indicate that the pressure limit for suppress-
ion by venting under normal or low gravity is a function
primarily of the fuel temperature. This information sug-
gests that rapid venting is most desirable in microgravity,
with the target total pressure reduced to as low as
10 kPa.
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The determination of the completion of fire extinguish-
ment in spacecraft is by no means straightforward.
Since burned material remains hot in the non-convective
environment, embers may reignite if prematurely
exposed to fresh air [70]. The Shuttle regulations permit
the crew to determine the fire cessation by observation,
but they also note that the smoke detector reading
should be stable or decreasing. For a fire in a closed
avionics bay, if the local power is off and an extinguisher
bottle is discharged, the fire is considered suppressed.
Corresponding fire-cessation criteria for the ISS are still
under review [71].
Considerable cleanup will be required after all fire
events, minor or major [72]. Atmospheric revitalization to
remove even trace quantities of fire and extinguishment
contamination may tax the environmental-control system
and require the use of portable crew breathing equip-
ment and filters for periods of time. On a longer time
scale, the subtle toxic and corrosive aftereffects of the
fire on equipment, systems, and payloads must be
recognized and appropriately controlled [2].
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The record of fire safety on the Shuttle confirms the
adequacy of the current fire-prevention policies and prac-
tices. The major premise of fire prevention is the qualifi-
cation of materials as fire-resistant. It is, of course,
impractical to test even a small, representative sampling
of materials in microgravity. The standard normal-gravity
tests, in which the modeled flame propagation and
extinction mechanisms are distinctly different from those
in low-gravity flames, are regarded as "worst-case"
representations. This implied margin of safety is known
to decrease when applied to materials under typical
microgravity environments with forced gas flows or at
sufficiently elevated oxygen concentrations.
Quantitative data relating combustion behavior in ventila-
ted microgravity to that in corresponding normal gravity
are scant. Consequently, research is aimed at an under-
standing of low-gravity flammability in order to develop
test protocols and predictive correlations to contribute to
the continued improvement of spacecraft fire prevention,
detection, suppression, and recovery.
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